We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity [L.G. Epstein, J. Zhang, Subjective probabilities on subjectively unambiguous events, Econometrica 69 (2001) 265-306; P. Ghirardato et al., Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, J. Econ. Theory 118 (2004) 133-173; K. Nehring, Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence, Math. Soc. Sci. 38 (1999) 197-213; J. Zhang, Subjective, ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility, Econ. Theory 20 (2002) 159-181] in the context of Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). We show that each definition of unambiguous events produces certain restrictions on the set of priors, and completely characterize each definition in terms of the properties it imposes on the MEU functional. We apply our results to two open problems. First, in the context of MEU, we show the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between the axiom of "Small unambiguous event continuity" (Epstein and Zhang, 2001) and the notions of unambiguous event due to Zhang (2002) and Epstein and Zhang (2001) . Second, we show that, in the context of MEU, the classes of unambiguous events according to either Zhang (2002) or Epstein and Zhang (2001) are always -systems. Finally, we reconsider the various definitions in light of our findings, and identify some new objects (Z-filters and EZ-filters) corresponding to properties which, while neglected in the current literature, seem relevant to us.
Introduction
The idea of Ambiguity has been central to the research in decision theory for several decades. The story is well-known. On one hand, Savage's theory [20] postulates that a decision maker be able to assign probabilities to all events. On the other hand, it is hard to dismiss the intuition that in many situations the information available to the decision maker might be insufficient for doing so. Roughly speaking, "Ambiguity" refers to these situations, and the classic experiments by Ellsberg [6] have convincingly demonstrated its empirical relevance.
The conflict featuring Savage's theory on one side and the idea of Ambiguity on the other, has generated spectacular theoretical developments: Choquet expected utility [21] , maxmin expected utility (henceforth, MEU) [10] and several generalizations of the latter [8, 14, 16] . All these models allow for modes of behavior that are not necessarily consistent with Savage's Subjective Expected Utility theory. In particular, they can accommodate behavior of the type observed by Ellsberg. Yet, in most of this work, the idea of Ambiguity has remained in the background: more like an inspirational muse rather than a central, fully spelled out concept.
The formalization of the concept of Ambiguity is a more recent matter, mostly of the past decade. Since the idea refers to situations where not all events are assigned probabilities, the goal has been that of characterizing such events. These are called ambiguous, and all the others are called unambiguous. As of today, several definitions have been proposed, amended, criticized and the literature, in spite of its recent start, is already quite sizeable. We refer the reader to [7, 8] for some of the history of the problem.
This wealth of definitions as well as the richness of the debate surrounding them (see, for instance, [7] [8] [9] 13, 15, [17] [18] [19] 22] ) motivate the present work. Our goal is to contribute to the debate by providing a new way of looking at the problem. We do so by studying the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity within the context of a familiar model like MEU. The novelty of our approach consists in the realization that the demand that a certain event be unambiguous is equivalent to the demand that the MEU functional-and, hence, the set of priors-display certain properties. As different definitions of "ambiguous event" lead to different properties, one achieves a better understanding of those very definitions. All the more, the focus of the debate can shift toward the desirability of these properties.
Our results admit a dual reading. Let x be a certain definition of Ambiguous event, and let T be an event. Our results say that T is x-unambiguous if and only if the MEU functional displays a certain property. Alternatively, one can view our results as follows. Let {A i } be a certain collection of events that are called at the outset as x-unambiguous. Then, our study shows (a) whether or not there exists a MEU model compatible with this situation; and, in the affirmative case, that (b) the set of priors defining the MEU functional must have a certain form. The latter case can be axiomatized by introducing an additional axiom in the familiar MEU setting.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 states and motivates the assumptions that we maintain throughout the paper. Section 3 reviews the various definitions of Ambiguity we consider. Section 4 focuses on the notions proposed by Nehring [17] and Ghirardato et al. [8] , while Section 5 on those proposed by Zhang [22] and Epstein and Zhang [7] . As mentioned above, the unifying theme is the realization that an event is x-unambiguous if and only if the set of priors (and hence the maxmin functional) displays a certain structure. In Section 6, we apply our results to study two open problems. The first regards the axiom of "Small unambiguous event continuity" introduced in [7] . The desirability of the axiom, which is crucial for the derivation of a unique probability measure on the classes of Zhang and Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events, has recently been questioned (see, in particular [15, 19] ). In the context of MEU, our main result states the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between this axiom and the notions of unambiguous event due to Zhang and Epstein-Zhang. The second problem regards the properties of the classes of unambiguous events according to [7, 22] , respectively. Both classes were originally claimed to be -systems. Later, Kopylov [15] showed that, in general, they are only mosaics (a notion he introduced). Yet, the problem of what conditions guarantee that those classes are, in addition, -systems has been left open. Here, we show that, in the context of MEU, those classes are indeed -systems. Finally (Section 7), we reconsider the various definitions of ambiguity in light of our findings, and identify some new objects (Z-filters and EZ-filters) corresponding to properties which, while neglected in the current literature, seem relevant to us. Proofs are in appendix. Section A.* in appendix refers to material contained in Section * in the main text.
Setting
Throughout the paper, S denotes the state space, is a -algebra of events in S and Y is the prize space, which we assume is a mixture space [4, 10] . The set of acts is F = {f : S → Y | f is simple and -measurable}, with generic elements f, g, h, . . . , etc.
Our goal is to achieve a deeper understanding of the meaning of various definitions of ambiguous event proposed in the literature. Studying the properties of unambiguous events in the context of a well-understood model like MEU seems to us one but an obvious step in this direction. This motivates our first assumption: Assumption 1 (MEU preferences, Gilboa and Schmeidler [10] ). The decision maker's preference relation, , on F is represented by the functional I : F → R defined by
where C is a convex and weak*-compact set of finitely additive probability measures on (S, ), and u : Y → R is a linear utility on the prize space.
We recall that the utility function u produces an embedding of the acts into the set B 0 ( ) of bounded real-valued simple functions on S, and the functional I (and, hence, the preference relation) is extended to the whole B 0 ( ) in the obvious way [10] . Because of this, from now on we drop any reference to the utility function (that is, from now on an act f if viewed as a real-valued function).
In pursuing our goal, we need to avoid spurious differences which might emerge solely as a consequence of the model we are using. In their work, both Zhang [22] and Epstein-Zhang [7] assume a rich setting, which leads to the existence of a countably additive, non-atomic probability measure on the class of unambiguous events. For other definitions, like Nehring's or Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci's, this is possible-in the context of MEU-only if all the priors are both countably additive and non-atomic, and only if the class of unambiguous events is sufficiently rich. This consideration motivates the remaining three assumptions. Axioms on the decision maker's preference relation leading to the properties stated in Assumptions 2 and 3 have been recently identified by Chateauneuf-Maccheroni-Marinacci-Tallon [4] , to which we refer the reader. The final assumption, which delivers the richness of the class of unambiguous events either in the sense of Nehring or Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci, requires a bit of preparation. By Assumption 2, there exists a prior, ∈ C, with respect to which all the other priors in C are absolutely continuous [4, Lemma 3] . Hence, for each prior there exists a density (with respect to ) and the set C is isometrically isomorphic to a set D ⊂ L 1 (S, , ). For A ∈ and with A c denoting the complement of A, let D ⊥ (A) = ∈ L ∞ (S, , ) | = 0 a.e on A c and g d = 0 for all g ∈ D .
Definition 1 (see Kingman and Robertson [12] ). D is said to be thin if and only if D ⊥ (A) is different from the zero subspace whenever (A) > 0. We also say that a set of priors C is thin if the corresponding set of densities is.
We can now state our final assumption:
Assumption 4 guarantees that the definitions of Ambiguity we are going to study are, indeed, comparable. In the context of Assumptions 1-3, it was shown in [2] (Proposition 4) that there exists a countably additive, non-atomic probability measure on the class of Ghirardato-Maccheroni-Marinacci (equivalently, Nehring's) unambiguous events if and only if Assumption 4 is satisfied. In order to get a better grasp of how restrictive Assumption 4 is, we remark that every finitedimensional set of non-atomic priors (i.e., every set of priors obtained as the convex hull of a finite number of priors) is thin. Thin sets, however, need not be finite-dimensional: as an example, let {A n } n∈N be a countable partition of the state space S and let {P n } n∈N be a collection of nonatomic priors with P n supported by A n for each n ∈ N. Then, it is easily seen that {P n } (and, hence co {P n }) is thin and infinite-dimensional. 1
Definitions of ambiguous events
We distinguish between two groups of definitions of ambiguous event. One group features the definitions given by Nehring [17] and Ghirardato et al. [8] , the other those given by Zhang [22] and Epstein and Zhang [7] . In the context of Multiple Prior models, the definitions of ambiguous event given by Nehring and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci are known to be equivalent, and correspond to the following
We borrow from Dubins and Margolis [5] , 2 and we call naturally measurable all events which satisfy Definition 2. The class of naturally measurable events is denoted by A NM . It is a straightforward consequence of the definition that the class A NM is a -system [8] ; in particular, it is closed under the operation of taking complements. Under Assumption 4, it contains events of measure , for any ∈ [0, 1] (see [2] ; this measure is univocally defined because of the very nature of naturally measurable events). 1 Matter of fact, infinite-dimensional thin sets of priors abound. It is an easy consequence of a theorem of Kadec and Pelczynski [11, Theorem 6 ] that every infinite-dimensional, non-reflexive subspace of L 1 contains an infinite-dimensional set, which is thin. 2 While introduced in a different context, the terminology seems especially suited to us (see [5] ).
Let f be a function on S and w be a real number (recall that acts have been identified to realvalued functions), we denote by f T w the real-valued function on S which coincides with f on T and is identically equal to w on T c . Naturally measurable events admit the following behavioral characterization, which is proven in [8] .
Proposition 1 (Ghirardato et al. [8] ). T is naturally measurable if and only if for any f, g ∈ F, w, w ∈ R and for any ∈ (0, 1)
The next two definitions are stated directly in behavioral terms. The definition proposed by Zhang [22] reads as follows.
and the same implication holds for T c . Otherwise T is Z-ambiguous.
The definition given in Epstein-Zhang [7] displays a similar structure but it is weaker in that limits the comparison (2) The restriction to comparisons involving only conjugate acts is motivated by the intuition that an event T should be called unambiguous if (and only if) the relative conditional likelihood of any two of its subevents, A and B, is invariant with respect to changes in the prize on T c (see [7] ). The classes of unambiguous events according to Zhang and Epstein-Zhang are denoted by A Z and A EZ , respectively. These two notions of ambiguity have been recently discussed by Kopylov [15] , who shows, among other results, that the two classes are mosaics and that they are not necessarily -systems. At any rate, in the setting we study, there is an obvious relation among the three notions, which we state in the next proposition.
As these inclusions come straight from the definitions, we do not provide a proof (however, many of the results we present later implicitly contain a proof of this fact). Under our assumptions, the inclusion A NM ⊆ A Z may be strict as illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 (Nehring [19] ). Fix an event T ∈ . Let 1 and 2 denote two weak*-closed and convex sets of finitely additive probability measures supported by T and T c , respectively. Fix , such that 0 < < < 1. Define the weak*-closed and convex set as follows:
and let the preference be the one induced by according to the MEU functional (1).
The reader can readily check that T is Z-unambiguous, and hence EZ-unambiguous, but not naturally measurable because = . As we shall see (Theorem 4), the example goes a long way beyond showing that the inclusion A NM ⊆ A Z is strict. In fact, it provides remarkable insights into the structure of events which are unambiguous either according to Zhang or to Epstein and Zhang.
Naturally measurable events
The main result of this section (Theorem 1) states the existence of a certain relation between naturally measurable events and the structure of the set C, which defines the MEU functional.
is a finite partition of S into naturally measurable events, then C can be written as a unique convex combination of a collection of sets {C T i } T i ∈ , C = q i C T i , and each measure in C T i is supported by T i . Equivalently, given a partition into naturally measurable events, the set C can be decomposed into a (canonical) system of sets of conditional measures. Later in this section and more thoroughly in Section 7, we will elaborate on the interpretation attached to this type of decomposition. For future reference, notice that in the special case = {T , T c } our result says that to each naturally measurable event there is associated a certain decomposition of the set of priors and, hence, a special form of the MEU functional I.
be a finite partition of S with the property that each T i ∈ A NM . For any n ∈ N, existence of such partitions is guaranteed by Assumption 4 of Section 2 (see [2] ). Theorem 1. There exist (a) a unique collection of non-empty, weak compact, and convex sets of priors {C T i } T i ∈ , where for any T i ∈ , C T i ⊆ {P | P is a probability measure on T i }; and (b) a unique probability distribution q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) such that for any f ∈ F
where q i = P (T i ), i = 1, . . . , n, for all P ∈ C. 3 We stress that the decomposition of Theorem 1 holds for any act f ∈ F. With this in mind, Theorem 1 lends itself to an interesting interpretation. We can think of a MEU decision maker as of someone who follows a two-step procedure. In the first step, acts are decomposed into a collection of subacts each defined on a naturally measurable event. No ambiguity is attached to any of these events and each subact is evaluated by means of a MEU functional. In the second step, all these evaluations are aggregated linearly by means of q. Theorem 1 has an obvious converse (whose proof is immediate), which we will use later (see Theorem 4):
be a partition of S, and, for each i, let C T i ⊆ {P | P is a probability measure on T i }. If C = n i=1 q i C T i , q i 0 and n i=1 q i = 1, then each T i is naturally measurable.
Zhang and Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
In this section, we study Zhang and Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events. We restrict attention to acts of the form f T w (and f T c w) since both Zhang and Epstein-Zhang consider only acts having this form. Throughout the section, T is a fixed event and we use the notation f (w) in the place of f T w. The rationale for this notational change will be clear in Section 5.2, below. We restrict to events T such that 0 < min P (T ) max P (T ) < 1 because if T is such that either min P (T ) = 0 and max P (T ) = 0 or min P (T ) = 1 and max P (T ) = 1, then T is necessarily EZ-ambiguous (see Appendix, Proposition 6). Finally, to simplify the exposition, we henceforth call Z/EZ unambiguous events those events T that satisfy only the first half of the original definition (for example: T is Z-unambiguous if it satisfies Eq. (2) without the symmetric requirement for T c ). This simplification is harmless: since both definitions consist of two separate parts, one gets a complete necessary/sufficient condition by simply requiring that the same condition be satisfied when one exchanges T with its complement T c .
Our analysis unfolds as follows. We begin by observing that the study of unambiguous events is intimately related to that of certain functionals. This point of view turns out to be extremely useful. At once, we are able to give a useful necessary condition for an event to be Z-unambiguous (Section 5.1), and to show that the problem we are concerned with lends itself to a simple geometrical description (Section 5.2). The first two Subsections prepare the ground for the two main results of the section. In Section 5.3, we give a complete characterization of Z-unambiguous events, while in Section 5.4 we show the equivalence between Zhang's and Epstein-Zhang's definitions.
From naturally measurable events to Zhang unambiguous events
In light of the inclusion A NM ⊆ A Z (Proposition 2), we are concerned with finding and characterizing those Zhang unambiguous events (if any) which are not naturally measurable. Our analysis takes off from the following considerations. Consider the two subsets of priors
Clearly, both C MAX and C MIN are non-empty, convex and weak*-compact. Moreover, it is immediate to verify that either C MAX ∩ C MIN = ∅ or C MAX = C MIN = C. By using the sets C MAX and C MIN , we can define two functionals,Ĩ and ≈ I , bỹ
The main reason for introducingĨ and ≈ I is that (as the reader can easily check) the ranking they induce on acts of the form f (w) is independent of w. That is,
For brevity, we will refer to this property as to w-invariance. The functionalsĨ and ≈ I provide us with another way to look at naturally measurable events. For if T is naturally measurable, then C MAX = C MIN = C and for any act f, we have I (f ) =Ĩ (f ) = ≈ I (f ). Hence, the unambiguous nature of T follows at once from the observed w-invariance Incidentally, this also shows the inclusion A NM ⊆ A Z .
If T is not naturally measurable, the functional I which evaluates the acts is, in general, different from bothĨ and ≈ I . The next lemma, however, shows that for any act f there exists a f (w * )
Equivalently, such an act is evaluated by a prior in C MIN [C MAX ].
Lemma 1. For any act of the type f (w),
Lemma 1 is a basic result in our analysis as it immediately leads to uncover a number of properties associated with Zhang unambiguous events. In fact, by combining Lemma 1 with the w-invariance ofĨ and ≈ I , we obtain at once the following necessary condition for T ∈ A Z .
Proposition 4. A necessary condition for
While the proof is in the appendix, the reader might want to defer its reading until next subsection, where we give a simple geometric explanation of the content of Proposition 4 ( Fig. 2 ).
A geometric analysis
The concepts we have seen so far lend themselves to a very simple geometric description. In fact, due to the restriction to acts of the form f (w), the functionals I,Ĩ and
In a similar fashion, by using the functionalsĨ and ≈ I in the place of I, we define the functionsĨ f and ≈ I f , which are straight lines with slopes 1 − P max (T ) and 1 − P min (T ), respectively. Finally, letÎ
The latter functions will play a major role in our analysis. Fig. 1 below describes all the functions corresponding to a given f as well as the content of Lemma 1. By means of this type of diagrams, we can now give a simple illustration of the necessary condition found above. In the notation just introduced, we can concisely reformulate the content of Proposition 4 as follows
Necessary and sufficient conditions
We are now ready to give a complete characterization of Zhang unambiguous events.
Theorem 2. T ∈ A Z if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
for any w ∈ R; (ii) The functional I restricted to acts of the form f T w is equal toÎ .
Sufficiency of the two conditions is immediate from geometrical inspection. Necessity of (i) was shown above. Only the proof of necessity of (ii) requires a certain amount of work. Summarily, here is how it goes: for C a set of priors, denote by C | T the set of conditional probabilities computed from probabilities in C. Now, suppose that
and consider the act 0T w (that is, the act that is identically equal to 0 on T and identically equal to w on T c ). A separation theorem due to Amarante and Maccheroni [3] implies that there exist two disjoint subsets, A and B, of T, such that P (A) − P (B) > 0 > Q(A) − Q(B) for any P ∈ C MIN and any Q ∈ C MAX . This suggests that, for > 0, we consider the act rT w, where r is the function r = [ A − B ], and A and B are the indicator functions of A and B, respectively. The continuity properties of the MEU functional imply (see Lemma 5 in appendix) that there exists an * such that for any measure R ∈ arg min (3) has to be non-empty. In the general case, for f an act of the type f T w, we consider the sets
and prove the following characterization of Condition NC.
Lemma 2.
Condition NC is equivalent to the condition that for any act f
Next, we show (Lemma 6 in appendix) that if for some f we have I f (w) <Î f (w), then it must be the case that
Then, in both cases, we can follow a procedure similar to the one outlined above to establish that T has to be Zhang ambiguous. That is if T ∈ A Z , then for any f, we must have I f (w) =Î f (w).
Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
As general matter (Section 3), Epstein-Zhang's definition is more permissive than Zhang's. In fact, conditions guaranteeing that the two are non-equivalent can be derived from Epstein-Zhang's paper, in particular Corollary 7.3. The next theorem, however, shows that the two coincide under Assumptions 1-4. . Given an f (w) with properties (a)-(c), we can then construct two acts
for > 0, and guarantee that there exist two values, w and w , such that
Notice that if f (w) is constant on T, we are done because g (w) and h (w) are EZ-conjugate. In the general case, a simple continuity argument would complete the proof.
Applications
The next theorem subsumes in a concise way most of the results of the previous sections. In addition, the theorem provides a representation of the MEU functional restricted to acts of the form f T w and f T c w for T an unambiguous event. Later, we use this representation to address two open questions concerning unambiguous events either in the sense of Zhang or Epstein-Zhang.
where 1 and 2 are weak*-closed, convex sets of priors supported by T and T c , respectively, and 0 < < 1, such that
for all acts f of the form gTw or gT c w, with g ∈ F and w ∈ R. Moreover,
The reader might have noticed that for naturally measurable events Theorem 4 is only a special case of Theorem 1-Proposition 3 in that it applies only to binary partitions, {T , T c }, and only to acts of the form gTw. In contrast, Theorem 1-Proposition 3 extend to arbitrary partitions and acts. A similar extension cannot be obtained for EZ-unambiguous events. This follows from Theorem 5 below, which states the existence of a fundamental incompatibility between the definitions of unambiguous events given by Zhang and Epstein-Zhang and the axiom of "small unambiguous event continuity" (see [7, Axiom 4] ). 4 While naturally measurable can always be decomposed into smaller naturally measurable events, this is not true for EZ-unambiguous events which are not naturally measurable. Precisely, we have the following theorem.
Then, T contains no EZ-unambiguous events.
The proof displays a certain amount of detail. The strategy is simple, nonetheless. By Theorem 4, an event T is EZ-unambiguous if and only if the set of priors can be decomposed in the way 4 Roughly, the axiom states that any unambiguous event contains unambiguous events of arbitrarily small probability.
The axiom is important in the work of Zhang, Epstein-Zhang and Kopylov [15] in that it allows to derive a convexranged probability on the class of unambiguous events. Recently, Nehring [19] has questioned the desiderability of the assumption. described above. Now, suppose that both T and A ⊂ T are EZ-unambiguous. Then, we have two decompositions of the set of priors: one relative to T and one relative to A. Of course, these two decompositions cannot be unrelated. For instance, an act of the type fAw can be viewed both as an act which is constant outside A and as an act which is constant outside T. Clearly, these two views must lead to the same evaluation because the act is the same. This simple observation allows us to conclude that the two different decompositions must satisfy a number of restrictions. Finally, we use these to produce two acts, fTk and gTk, whose ranking is not invariant with respect to changes in the constant k, thus contradicting the assumption either T ∈ A EZ or A ∈ A EZ .
As mentioned above, Theorem 5 implies that for EZ-unambiguous events Theorem 4 does not extended to partitions with more than two elements. In fact, if we were to suppose that {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 } is a partition of S into EZ-unambiguous events which are not naturally measurable, then we would incur into the contradiction that T 2 ∪ T 3 = T c 1 is EZ-unambiguous and contains an EZ-unambiguous event.
Theorem 5 also raises a delicate conceptual issue. Suppose that a preference relation produces an event which is EZ-unambiguous but contains no EZ-unambiguous events. In principle, this presents us with two options: either we conclude that EZ definition does not apply to our preference relation or we do not call the event unambiguous because it fails the axiom of small unambiguous event continuity. The first option seems consistent with EZ work as they state the axiom as an axiom on preferences. This view, however, produces a major shortcoming because it forces us to conclude that the definition does not apply to a vast class of MEU preferences. In fact (see next section), it is easy to give examples of MEU preferences producing events of this sort. The second option, that of not calling the event EZ-unambiguous, does not seem very convincing. At any rate, if we adhere to this interpretation, then Theorem 5 would leave us with no choice but to call unambiguous only the events that are naturally measurable.
The second question we address regards the properties of the classes A Z and A EZ . These classes were originally believed to be -systems, but Kopylov [15] observed that, generally speaking, this is not the case. In [15] , Kopylov provides an axiomatization guaranteeing that these classes are mosaics (a weaker property, see [15] ), and, more recently, 5 gave an example of a preference relation for which A Z and A EZ are not -systems. A rather immediate implication of Theorem 5 is that this cannot be the case in the setting we have been studying. In other words, we have
The reason is clear. By Theorem 5, any two events A and B in A EZ \A NM cannot be disjoint unless one is the complement of the other. Hence, the property of A EZ to be a -system follows at once from the property of A NM . Once again, we remark that it need not be the case that A EZ = A NM . In fact, it is easy to give examples where A EZ strictly contains A NM (see next section).
Comments
Theorem 4 makes it clear that there are unquestionable similarities across the various definitions of unambiguous event we have been examining. As a matter of fact, Theorem 4 shows that all the definitions convey the idea that if T is unambiguous in a MEU model, then the model itself can be thought of as consisting of two separate, but unambiguously defined, models: one defined on T 5 Private communication. and the other on T c . The only difference is that these two models are aggregated "linearly" if T is naturally measurable (Theorem 1), while this is not the case if T is Z/EZ-unambiguous. Clearly, scholars favoring the notion of naturally measurable events might argue that Zhang's and Epstein-Zhang's definitions are "too weak" [19] exactly because of this reason. To us, this difference does not seem substantial. Let us elaborate on the point. For the sake of illustration, let us begin with a decision maker who conforms to the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) criterion. Probably, every scholar would agree that any (measurable) subset T of S should be called unambiguous. Each subset is associated to a number of properties: the decision maker is "a SEU maximizer on T", he is "probablistically sophisticated on T", he is "linear with respect to acts that are constant outside T", etc.
Now, suppose that we want to come up with a definition of unambiguous event. In a situation of complete (a priori) ignorance, we might adopt the following strategy: we abstract from the SEU model, and identify the unambiguous nature of an event with one of the properties displayed by the SEU example. For instance, one definition would call T unambiguous if the decision maker is probabilistically sophisticated on T, another if he is linear with respect to acts that are constant outside T, etc. One of the properties that each and every event T displays in the SEU example is that knowledge of the conditional probabilities on T and T c along with knowledge of the minimum probability assigned to T and T c allows us to recover uniquely the entire model. This is trivial, for if P is the probability which describes the decision maker, then P can be uniquely written as P (·) = P (T )P (· | T ) + P (T c )P (· | T c ). In a MEU model, Theorem 4 tells us that the unambiguous nature of an event according to Zhang or Epstein-Zhang is precisely identified by this property (because the conditions in Theorem 4 are necessary and sufficient). In this respect, these definitions appear to us as a natural extension of those proposed by Nehring and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci. A simple example will clarify the point further. Let S = [0, 1] be endowed with the usual Borel -algebra, and consider a MEU decision maker who is described by a set of priors C = co { , }. Assume further that has a density with respect to given by
and that is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] (we denote its density by g = 1 on [0, 1]) ( Fig. 3 ). Let T = [0, 1/3). It is easy to see that every non-null naturally measurable subset of S intersects both T and its complement. Moreover, T and its complement are EZ-unambiguous (Theorem 4) and, evidently, not naturally measurable. By Theorem 5, any subset of T is EZ-ambiguous and it is transparent that it cannot be naturally measurable. In the notation of Theorem 4, it is immediate to check that for T = [0, 1/3), 1 and 2 are defined by the densities 3 T and 3 2 T c , respectively. Moreover (in the same notation), = 1/3, = 1/2 and C = [ , ] 1 + [1 − , 1 − ] 2 . That is, knowledge of the conditional models, 1 and 2 , and of and permits to reconstruct C uniquely. In contrast, suppose that we take A = [0, 1/4) rather than T. In this case, the conditional models are defined by the two sets of densities Fig. 4 ). In other words, if A is not Z/EZ-unambiguous, knowledge of the conditional models is insufficient to uncover the decision maker's global behavior.
Transparently, the most striking difference is the lack of compatibility of Epstein-Zhang notion with the axiom of small unambiguous event continuity. We have already commented on this following the statement Theorem 5.
We come now to our final observations. One of the main themes in the work of Zhang and Epstein-Zhang is the intuitive link between a notion of unambiguous events and Savage's Surething Principle. This intuition is transparently incorporated in their definitions. Now, suppose that, in loose terms, one interprets their view as conveying that T should be called unambiguous if conditional on T, the decision maker is representable without reference to what happens outside T. Consider the event A = [0, 1/4) in the example above. There is no doubt that A satisfies the criterion. In fact, A satisfies the first part of Epstein-Zhang definition. Yet, A is ambiguous as we saw above and the reason is that its complement fails the first part of the definition. A natural question is, why should we demand that Zhang and Epstein-Zhang classes be closed under complementation? We do not have a clear answer. Yet, we would like to stress the legitimacy of our question: closure under complementation is a property which follows from the definition of naturally measurable event, while it is imposed in the definitions of Zhang and Epstein-Zhang. On one hand, Theorem 4 and the example of this section show that, if the classes are not closed under complementation, the decomposition property of Theorem 4 does not hold. Hence, if one believes that the unambiguous nature of an event should be identified by the property we described in the first paragraph of this section, then there is no choice but to impose closure under complementation. On the other hand, if one's intuition conforms to the less demanding interpretation we just gave, one should probably give up the requirement of closure under complementation.
Finally, let us observe that events like A in the example above have several special properties. In particular, A is such that all of its subsets satisfies the first part of Zhang's definition (the decision maker is SEU conditional on A). While events like these have been completely neglected in the current literature, it seems indisputable to us that they deserve a place in a debate centered around the notion of ambiguity. Usually the idea of ambiguity is associated to that of coarse information. In contrast, SEU or probabilistic sophistication are associated to the idea of precise or fine information. It seems then natural to consider situations characterized by coarse information in some parts of the state space and by fine information in some other parts. To this end, depending on whether one leans toward SEU or probabilistic sophistication as a choice for a benchmark, one should identify those events with the property that each and every subevent satisfy the first part of Zhang (SEU) or Epstein-Zhang (probabilistic sophication) definition. Due to their properties, objects of this sort should be called Z-filters and EZ-filters, respectively.
To focus ideas, suppose that S = [0, 1] and let {I n } n∈N be a countable partition of [0, 1], where each I n is an interval. Using notation like that in Theorem 5, consider a MEU decision maker with set of priors C = n∈N [ n , n ]P n , where each P n is a non-atomic priors supported on I n , and n = n . Assume further that all P n 's are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. Globally, this is a MEU decision maker with an infinite dimensional set of priors. However, for almost every point in [0, 1]-i.e., except for the intervals' endpoints-there exists a neighborhood of the point such that, conditional on that neighborhood, the decision is a SEU decision maker. Such a decision maker is associated to a countable family of Z-filters, the family of intervals {I n }, none of which is either naturally measurable or Z/EZ-unambiguous. Similar examples can be given by replacing SEU with probabilistic sophistication and Z-filters with EZ-filters.
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Appendix A.

A.4. Naturally mesurable events
Proof of Theorem 1. Let E be an event. For f ∈ F denote by f E = f | E the restriction of f to E, and let F | E be set of all such restrictions. When E is endowed with the restriction of to E, each element in F | E is measurable. Given E, define a preference relation E on F | E by "f E E g E iff f Ew gEw for some w ∈ R". The following lemma shows that if E is naturally measurable, then E is well-defined. that is f Ew gEw .
We can now prove Theorem 1. Let = {T i } n i=1 be a finite partition of S with the property that T i ∈ A NM for each i and denote by F the set of acts which are constant on each T i . In other words, F is the set of all step functions on the partition .
Proof of Theorem 1. For any f ∈ F and any g ∈ F , we have
Now, for each i, define the preference T i by
By the previous lemma, T i is well-defined. It is easy to see that T i satisfies all the axioms of Gilboa-Schmeidler [10] (because does). Hence, T i has a MEU representation. That is, there exists a unique collection of non-empty, weak compact, and convex set of priors C T i , each supported by T i such that I T i : F | T i →R defined by I T i (f ) = min P ∈C T i T i f dP represents T i . Now, define z : F →R | | (| | is the cardinality of ) by f −→ (I T i (f )) T i ∈ , and define v : R | | → R as the unique mapping which makes the diagram below commute
That is, v((I T i (f )) T i ∈ ) = I (f ). To complete the proof, it suffices to show that v(.) is a positive linear functional on R | | .
(a) v(.) is homogeneous:
..,n ∈ (I T i (F)) T i ∈ , define a pair of acts f and g by f (s) ...,n ) .
(c) v(.) is positive: Trivially because I (.) is a positive function.
Finally, since v(.) is a positive linear functional there is a positive measure q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) on R | | such that
(q is a probability measure because I (1) = 1). Proof. Let T be such that 0 = min P (T ) < max P (T ) 1. Let C 1 = arg max P ∈C P (T ). Since C 1 is thin, there exists (by an easy application of Lyapunov's convexity theorem) an event A ⊂ T such that P (A) = 2/3P (T ) for any P ∈ C 1 . Consider the acts a(w) = ( A − A c )T w andā(w) = ( A c − A )T w. It is immediate to see that there exists n ∈ N such that for w − n both acts are evaluated by P's such that P (T ) = 0. Hence, I (ā(w)) = w = I (a(w)), that isā(w) a(w). Similarly, for w n, both acts are evaluated by P's in C 1 , and we have I (a(w )) > I (ā(w )). The same argument with T c in the place of T completes the proof.
A.5. Zhang and Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
A.5.1. From naturally measurable events to Zhang unambiguous events
Proof of Lemma 1. For each w, denote by Z w a measure such that min
Suppose that the inequality is strict for any w, that is 6 min
which is equivalent to
Then, for any w there must exist a Z w such that (i) Z w (T c ) < P MAX (T c ) (otherwise, we are done); and (ii) inequality (4) is true. Consider the sequence {w n = −n} and the associated sequence Z w n (T c ) . 7 Since Z w n (T c ) ⊂ [P MIN (T c ), P MAX (T c )], there exists a subsequence
We have only two possibilities:
(a) if x = P MAX (T c ), then ∃ > 0 such that x + < P MAX (T c ) and ∃n such that ∀n n
Hence,
that is, the expression on the RHS of (4) is unbounded. Hence, inequality (4) must be violated because the LHS is bounded. It follows that the only possibility is
Since f is a simple function on T, f can be written as
which implies < −n, a contradiction. 7 Once again, Z w n need not be unique, but the reasoning in the proof is independent of the choice we make.
The preceding shows that there exists a w * such that I (f (w * )) = ≈ I (f (w * )). That is,
for any Z / ∈ C MIN . Now, we want to show that it is so for any w w * . 8 Let > 0, and suppose by the way of contradiction that there exists a measure Z w * − / ∈ C MIN such that
The integral on T is not affected by changes in w (by the w-invariance of ≈ I ). Hence, this is the same as min (g(w) ). Hence, for any w, I (f (w)) − I (g(w)) < ≈ I (g(w)) − I (g(w) ). By the previous lemma, ∃w such that I (g(w)) = ≈ I (g(w)), and at suchw we would have I (f (w)) < I (g(w) ), contradicting T ∈ A Z . Similarly for part (b).
A.5.2. A geometric analysis
Proof of Proposition 5. I (f (w)) = min C T f dP + wP (T c ) .
(a) w 1 w 0 implies that, for any P,
(c) Let {w n } ⊂ R be such that w n → w. Then, f (w n ) → f (w) in the supnorm topology.
Continuity of I implies I (f (w n )) → I (f (w)). Hence, I f (w n ) → I f (w).
A.5.3. Necessary and sufficient conditions
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by establishing a simple fact. Recall that for C a set of priors, the notation C | T stands for the set of conditional probabilities computed from probabilities in C. (g(w) ). This is equivalent to
which, by virtue of the assumption, is in turn equivalent to (g(w) ).
Hence, for any w ∈ R,Î f (w) Î g (w) because of the w-invariance of the functionals ≈ I andĨ . Now, if T ∈ A Z and f (w) g(w) for some w, then f (w ) g(w ) for any w ∈ R. By Lemma 1, ∃w * such that ≈ I (f (w * )) ≈ I (g(w * )). Hence, the conclusion follows from the w-invariance of ≈ I and the previous observation.
However, it is evident that, in general, the condition in the previous lemma is more than it is necessary. A weaker condition is obtained as follows. For f of the above type, define In order to prove the necessity of the condition, we need two additional results. The first is a separation theorem proven in [3] (In [3] , this is stated as Corollary 5). Let C 1 and C 2 be weak*compact subsets of ba 1 ( ), and assume that both C 1 and C 2 consist of countably additive measures. Further, assume that every measure is non-atomic and that C 1 ∪ C 2 is thin. All these assumptions are satisfied in our setting. We have Theorem 6 (Amarante and Maccheroni [3] ).
The second result is stated in the following lemma.
Because of the assumption, this property does not depend on the choice we made. By Theorem 6, there exist two disjoint sets A, Moreover (by construction), there exist two disjoint subsets K, J ⊂ {1, . . . , m} such that
Now, for > 0 consider the simple function defined by
Notice that for every measure Q
Claim 1. For any w ∈ R, we have
andĨ
Proof of Claim 1. From Eq. (7), we have
which proves one inequality in (8) . As for the other,
Similarly for (9) . (6) . We can now complete the proof of the lemma by simply observing that
Now, we can proceed by defining a new function h , > 0, exactly as in the proof of Lemma 2. Immediately, we have that for any w ∈ R,
The proof of this statement is exactly the same as the proof of Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 
A.5.4. Epstein-Zhang unambiguous events
Let f be such that ( Proof. The existence of an * > 0 and of two points w and w such thatÎ (h * (w)) >Î (f (w)) andÎ (h * (w )) <Î (f (w )) was already shown in Lemma 2. Moreover, the last inequality holds for any > 0 (see proof of Lemma 2). By a similar argument, one shows that there exists an * * > 0 such that (see proof of Lemma 2)
with the inequalityÎ (f (w)) >Î (g (w)) holding for any > 0. To complete the proof, we only need to show that we can choose the same for both h and g. To this end, it suffices to show that I (h * (w)) >Î (f (w)) ⇒Î (h (w)) >Î (f (w)) for any 0 < < * , I (g * * (w )) >Î (f (w )) ⇒Î (g (w )) >Î (f (w )) for any 0 < < * * .
This follows straight from the concavity ofÎ . In fact, noticing that for any 0 < < * ,
and similarly forÎ (g (w )).
Proof of Theorem 3. The inclusion A Z ⊂ A EZ comes straight out of the definitions. We are going to show that T / ∈ A Z ⇒ T / ∈ A EZ thus showing that A Z ⊃ A EZ . First, suppose that condition (i) in Theorem 2 is violated. Then, there exist g and h like in the previous lemma so that (recall that, from Lemma 1, the points w and w can be chosen so thatÎ in the inequalities in Lemma 7 can be taken equal to I) because, for any n, ≈ 1 n f (w) ⊂ C MIN , and we know that ≈ 1 n f (w) contains at least a measure P (in fact, all) such that P (B) − P (A) < 0. Since r(w) and r(w) are EZ-conjugate, this shows that T is EZ-ambiguous.
Finally, a proof that T is EZ-ambiguous if condition (i) in Theorem 2 is satisfied but condition (ii) is violated is obtained exactly along the same lines by taking into account Lemma 6 (see proof of Theorem 2).
A.6. Applications
Proof of Theorem 4. We prove the statement only for acts of the form f T w. The proof for acts of the form f T c w follows at once by exchanging T and T c .
(Necessity) Fix an MEU model with set of priors C. Since T ∈ A Z , we have I =Î for all acts of type f T w (Theorem 2). Hence, I (f (w)) = min
can be written as 2 . For any f (w), it can be readily checked that 
We are going to show that equality holds. By definition of 1 , any minimizer of T f dP(· | T ) is either in
By definition, there exists a _ P ∈ C MAX whose conditional on T coincides withP .
In fact, Q ∈˜ f implies that for any measure in C MAX , hence for _ P , we have
Hence, T f dQ(· | T ) = T f dP . Since T ∈ A Z , Condition NC holds and by Lemma 2
Similarly, we reach the same conclusion if we start by assuming thatP ∈ C MIN | T . Now, (20) show that equality holds in (19) , that is
(Sufficiency) Immediate. The equality A Z = A EZ was shown in Theorem 3. Finally, if T ∈ A NM , T c ∈ A NM , Theorem 1 applies and C = C * = 1 + [1 − ] 2 . In the converse direction, suppose that T ∈ A EZ and that = . Suppose, by contradiction that T / ∈ A NM , then there must exist a P ∈ C\C * such that P (T ) = . It is easy to see that, in such a case, there is an act of the form xTy, x, y ∈ R, such that min C xT y dP = min C * xT y dP which contradicts the first part of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. We divide the proof into several claims. To begin, let T ∈ A Z \A NM and let A ⊂ T . Define 
Proof. Let f (w) = 0Aw. Observe that f (w) is an act which is constant both on A c and on T c . Therefore, by Theorems 4 and 2, I (f (w)) = I T (f (w)) = I A (f (w)), where I · (f (w)) = min{ min
We have,
By
Since w > 0, we have
From which we conclude (since P * ∈ C T MAX ) that
Similarly, one shows that C T MIN ∩ C A MIN = л by taking w < 0.
Before tackling the proof of Theorem 5, we need one more observation. Let f ∈ F be a three step act f = [k, A; k , T \A; k , T c ] (this notation was explained in Section 3). Such an act can be thought of in two different ways. As an act of the form f T k and as an act of the form f A c k. For T ∈ A EZ , from Theorem 2 we have that I (f (k )) = I T (f (k )). Hence,
By choosing k small enough, we can guarantee that and some P ∈ C T MIN attain the minimum. Moreover, for k > k we can guarantee that the P in C T MIN is such that P (A) = (existence of such a P in C T MIN was shown in Claim 1 above). In the same fashion, by choosing k big enough, we can guarantee that the minimum obtains for and some P in C T MAX . Moreover, for k > k such a P would be such that P (A) = = min P ∈C T MAX P (A) is used. Summarizing, for k > k the evaluation of a three step act like ours is either
or
By definition of , and , we have . We can prove our first result. The proof is restricted to the case < . The case = will be dealt with in the proof of Proposition 8, below. By choosing x and y as in Fig. 5 (a), we get I (f (k )) − I (g(k )) > 0 and I (f (k)) − I (g(k)) < 0, thus contradicting T ∈ A EZ . Case 2: a b > c d . By choosing x and y as in Fig. 5(b) , we get I (f (k )) − I (g(k )) > 0 and I (f (k)) − I (g(k)) < 0, again contradicting T ∈ A EZ .
Case 3: a b = c d . We distinguish between two subcases. 
By choosing k small enough so that both f (k ) and g(k ) are evaluated as in (21), we have I (f (k )) − I (g(k )) = (k − t) + ( − )(k − t ) = 2 + ( − )(− ) < 0.
On the other hand, by definition of a and c, we have a < c. Hence, )k (by (23) ).
That is, I (f (k)) = k + ( − )k + (1 − )k. Next, observe that c > a, b > d and > 0 imply Choose k big enough so that both f (k) and g(k) are evaluated as in (21), we have
That is,
Next, observe that c > a, d > b, > (see (23); d > b by the assumption) imply (23)).
That is, I (g(k)) = k + ( − )t + (1 − )t . Combining the last two findings,
Now, equality (27) and inequality (28) contradict A c ∈ A EZ . To complete the proof, the only case left to consider is = . This can be dealt with by using the same construction as in the proof of Proposition 8, below. 
Next, observe that by construction t > k > k , which implies that f (k) is evaluated as in (30) while g(k) is evaluated as in (29). Thus, by our choice of I (f (k)) − I (g(k)) = + ( − ) < 0.
Now, inequality (31) and inequality (32) contradict T ∈ A EZ .
This, along with Proposition 7 completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Corollary 1. It is immediate that л and S are in A EZ . Moreover, by definition, A EZ is closed under complementation. Now, we need to show that if A, B are in A EZ and A ∩ B = л, then A ∪ B ∈ A EZ . We are going to show that if A, B are in A EZ and A ∩ B = л, A = B c , then both A and B are necessarily naturally measurable. Then, the property follows from the fact that naturally measurable events make up a -system. To begin, suppose that B ∈ A EZ \A NM . Then, B c ∈ A EZ because A EZ is closed under complementation, and B c / ∈ A NM (because otherwise one would contradict B ∈ A EZ \A NM ). That is, B c ∈ A EZ \A NM . By assumption, A ∩ B = л which implies B c ⊃ A (strictly). By Theorem 5, this contradicts A ∈ A EZ . That is, B ∈ A NM . By reversing the role of A and B, one shows A ∈ A NM .
Finally, the property that A EZ is closed under countable disjoint unions follows from the fact that A NM is.
